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1.1 
Old age income security is one of society’s most pressing concerns. A decline in family 
support of the  aged, major  increases in the  length of  retirement, and social security’s 
long-term financial  difficulty are all reasons for the growing anxiety. Consideration  of current 
and past socioeconomic data provides a solid basis for this anxiety. 
Between 1950 and 1970 the fraction of the aged living with their children declined from 
31 to 9 percent.’  Today fewer than 3 percent of elderly households receive income  from their 
children.z  These contributions represent less than 1 percent of the income of  the elderl~.~ 
Life expectancy for males at age 25 is 46.9 additional  years, up from 44.6 years in 1  950.4 
Despite this  increase, the average  number of  years  worked  by  25-year-old males has 
declined by 3.13 years.5 Together, these changes have almost doubled the expected 
duration of  retirement and other nonworking periods for  males from 5.93 years to  11.47 
years. The ratio of  nonworking to working years for males is now .32, more than twice the 
1950 value. For females, growth in the expected work  span, associated with dramatic 
postwar increases in labor force participation, has exceeded growth in the expected life 
span by 3.26 years. However, if one measures female work years on a male-equivalent 
earnings basis, the average young adult’s expected nonworking period has increased by 
3.60  years.6According  to this measure, 25-year-olds  can now expect to spend 1.2  years out 
of  the work force for every year they spend in the work force.’ 
Difficulties in financing an extended retirement without major family support have been 
eased considerably by sizable increases  in real social security benefits.  These benefits now 
represent the major source of income for 54 percent of the aged.8  However, the continued 
reliance on social security benefits as  the primary source of  old age income support is 
becoming increasingly unlikely. Demographic changes continue to place the Social Secur- 
ity System in a long-term financial  crisis. Changes in fertility rates are expected to lower the 
ratio of social security contributors to beneficiaries  from the current value of 3.2 to 1.5 by the 
year 2040.9The  1983 social security legislation  notwithstanding,  unless additional measures 
are enacted shortly, social security tax rates,  including health insurance  tax rates,  could rise 
as  high as  25  percent by the early  part of  the  next century to meet  projected benefit 
payments.lo 
The rapid growth of private, state, and local pensions in the 1950%  1960s,  and 1970s 
represents a natural response to changes in family support of the elderly, an expansion of 
the retirement period, and uncertainty concerning the amount of retirement income one can 
expect from social security. Special tax incentives,  a recognition  of the advantages  of group 
insurance  policies, and the  use of  fringe benefits to  avoid periodic government  wage 
controls are important additional explanations of  pension growth. 
The American pension system is, however, more than simply the inevitable product of 
changing social, demographic,  and economic conditions. Pensions themselves are playing 
an increasingly important role in shaping social conditions and altering economic behavior. 
Pensions and the Economics of Aging 
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Today one in every 2.21 American workers is covered under a private, state, or local pension 
plan. Almost 30 percent of  elderly households now receive pension benefits from these 
plans representing, on average, 31.39 percent of their total income. This pervasive eco- 
nomic institution, in conjunction with the Social Security System, enhances individual inde- 
pendence, but also diminishes a heretofore important economic function of  the family. 
In the economic arena, pensions raise a host of  questions for  labor, insurance, and 
financial markets. Structural features of  many pension plans provide significant incentives 
for long-term employment with the plan sponsor, but also provide significant disincentives to 
continued employment beyond the plan's  permissible retirement ages. Vesting, benefit, and 
retirement provisions determine pension compensation on the basis of general rather than 
specific  employee  characteristics.  This  feature of  pensions may militate against hiring 
particular types of job applicants if nonpension compensation cannot appropriately adjust 
for particular worker attributes. 
With respect to insurance, employer-sponsored pensions explain, in part, the trivially 
small private market in annuities. Presumably, pensions also affect the purchase of private 
life insurance; some workers purchase life insurance to protect their families against loss of 
pension income in the event of their early demise. 
Pension  funds are playing an increasingly important role in financial markets because of 
both the size of  their holdings and their allocation across various financial assets. In 1950 
pension  reserves represented  1.9 percent  of  total  household wealth:  in  1980 pension 
reserves exceeded 6.0 percent of  household wealth. Pension investments are highly con- 
centrated in financial  securities. Currently pension funds own close to 15 percent of  all 
corporate stock, 26 percent of corporate bonds, and 5 percent of federal, state, and local 
government securities." For the majority of pension plans, the portfolio decisions of pension 
fund managers directly affect the ultimate amount of pension income received by participat- 
ing workers; in other cases, such decisions may influence the financial valuation of  the 
employer's enterprise, since the firm may be legally obligated to pay specified pension 
benefits independent of  the performance of  the pension fund. 
Pensions may also be affecting the nation's rate of saving. Employer-sponsored pen- 
sions obviously  represent a substitute for  household retirement saving, but the  rate of 
substitution may be greater or less than dollar for dollar. A key feature of saving in the form of 
pension benefit accrual is the illiquidity of the investment. Young households unable to gain 
direct  access  to  these  funds  or  to  borrow  against these  assets from  formal  financial 
institutions or their relatives may be reducing their consumption and raising their total saving 
above its alternative value. The tax-free accumulation of capital income within pension funds 
may provide incentives for increased total household saving to the extent that these tax 
advantages are affecting marginal household consumption decisions and not simply alter- 
ing the allocation of a given amount of household saving between pension and nonpension 
saving vehicles.  Pensions could also be altering national saving if  workers sytematically 
over- or underestimate the extent of  retirement income forthcoming from their pensions. 
Similarly, stockholders of companies with unfunded pension benefit liabilities may systema- 
tically over- or undervalue these liabilities. Such practices would affect stock market valua- 
tions, stockholders' perceptions of  their true net worth, and ultimately stockholders' con- 
sumption patterns. 
Pensions raise many important questions for the economic performance of the econ- 
omy. The answers to such questions are of  importance to social scientists and to govern- 
ment officials charged with pension regulation. But those with the highest stake in the 
answers are surely the actual workers and employers who enter into the semicontractual 
relationship known as a pension plan. 
1.2  Objectives and Organization 
The  purpose of  this volume is to provide a reference base of  pension data that is 
accessible to a wide audience ranging from economists studying  compensating wage 
ditferentials, to officials of the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation charged with insuring 
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covered workers.i2The book deals almost exclusively  with private, state, large city, and other 
local pensions. Information on federal pensions, including the Social Security, Railroad 
Retirement, Civil Service, and Military Retirement Systems, is readily available in numerous 
other publication~.’~ 
The material is organized into six chapters. Chapter 2 details data sources and statisti- 
cal procedures. Chapter 3 addresses pension coverage, including both its historical growth 
and its cross-sectional variation with demographic and economic characteristics of  the 
working population. This chapter also surveys the receipt of pension income by the elderly, 
describes characteristics of the beneficiary population, and compares pension income with 
various measures of pre-retirement earnings. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the structure and 
financial status of  private pension plans. Chapters 6 and 7 conduct a similar analysis for 
state and local plans. Structural features of  pension plans include participation require- 
ments, vesting and benefit formulae, benefit levels, requirements for  early and normal 
retirement,  provisions for cost of living adjustments, and protection for disability. Chapters 4 
and 6 enumerate the number of plans with particular structural features and the number of 
pension participants affected by these features. 
Chapters 5 and 7 present estimates of unfunded liabilities of private, state, and local 
pension funds, along with historic and current levels of  pension fund contributions, benefit 
payments, and assets. These chapters describe how the portfolio composition of private 
pension funds varies with  plan type,  plan size, and industry. In addition, the financial 
chapters examine the historic performance of returns on pension investments  using special 
information provided by five private sector surveys. 
Data availability, time, and space limitations constrained the choice of topics and the 
detail of the analysis. Consequently, the treatment of  private and public pension systems 
differs depending on the topic in question. For example, since almost 90 percent of state and 
local workers but fewer than half of private sector workers are covered by pensions, most of 
chapter 3 explores socioeconomic determinants of  private sector pension coverage. The 
analysis of  unfunded pension liabilities also  differs for  the  private and public  sectors. 
Chapter 7 presents liability estimates for public pension systems prepared by Dr. Frank S. 
Arnold on the basis of a uniform set of actuarial procedures. These estimates  were prepared 
because official government reports of these liabilities are unavailable on an actuarially 
consistent basis. In addition, while previous unofficial studies have focused on particular 
segments of public pension systems, the differences in actuarial procedures used in these 
studies limit their ~omparability.’~  In the case of  private pension liabilities, official estimates 
calculated on asomewhat more consistent basis are available for many large corporations in 
their  1980 annual reports. These official estimates and the discount rates used in their 
calculation are presented in chapter 5. 
Only a fraction of the data in this volume is summarized in each section’s discussion of 
principal findings. The textual description of key features of the data is intended to guide the 
reader’s use of the tables rather than to provide a substitute for individual scrutiny of  the 
tabulations. 
The data are presented from a variety of perspectives suggested by underlying eco- 
nomic and social questions. They  are also presented at  various levels of  aggregation, 
permitting the reader to quickly grasp central bivariate correlations without precluding a 
more detailed understanding of  underlying multiple correlations. A final principle guiding 
data presentation is that dispersions around central tendencies can be as interesting as the 
central tendencies themselves. Therefore, to the extent possible, the book describes both 
the average characteristics of pension plans, participants, and recipients and the distribu- 
tion of  plans, participants, and recipients by pension and demographic characteristics. 
1.3  The Emerging Role of Pensions in the American Economy: 
Postwar Patterns of Growth 
Private, state, and local pensions now cover over 45.28 percent of the U.S. labor force. 
In 1950 the figure was 19.93 percent. Coverage of  private wage and salary workers more 4  Introduction 
than doubled over the 1950s, 196Os, and 1970s, from 23.79 percent to almost 50 percent. 
Coverage of state and local government workers increased from 60 to 90 percent. 
In 1980 over one-quarter of all individuals age 60 and over reported receipt of pension 
income from private, state, and local pension plans; the figure in 1969 was only 13 percent. 
Taking elderly households as the unit of analysis, the fraction reporting pension income rose 
from 18.4 to 27.9 percent over this period. The fraction of the elderly receiving pensions will 
almost certainly continue to grow through the 1980s and 199Os, reflecting recent increases 
in the fraction of  US.  workers covered by private, state, and local pensions. 
Growth in pension fund contributions, benefit payments, and assets has been associ- 
ated with this sizable growth in pension coverage and in the fraction of the elderly receiving 
pension benefits. In 1950 contributions to private pension funds represented 1.69 percent of 
total private sector wage and salary compensation. By 1975  the percentage was 5.10. Over 
the period 1950 to 1979 contributions per covered worker in constant 1980  dollars rose from 
$731.77 to $1,494.53. Contributions per covered worker (in 1980 dollars) for state and local 
pension plans increased from $2,098 to $3,272 between 1960 and 1980. 
During the 30 years from 1950 to 1980 the annual growth rate in real pension benefit 
payments averaged 1  1 percent for private plans and 7.36 for state and local plans. Pension 
benefits in 1980 represented over 12 percent of the income of the elderly, up from 3 percent 
in 1950. 
The size and composition of  pension fund assets have changed considerably since 
1950. In that year the assets of  private, state, and local pension funds and the reserves of 
insurance companies held to meet insured benefit payments equaled $60.24 billion (1  980 
dollars). The figure today exceeds $650 billion. Public pension assets have grown at roughly 
the same rate as private pension fund assets. In 1950, 27.84 percent of total private, state, 
and local pension fund assets were held by state and local pension funds. In 1980 the 
fraction was 30.44 percent. 
For noninsured private pension funds the share of assets invested in equities rose from 
33.71 to 59.15 percent over the years 1955 to 1980. The equity share of state and local 
pension portfolios grewfrom 2.0 percent in 1950  to 21.3 percent in 1979.  These figures likely 
understate the movement into equities, since investments in pooled funds increased stead- 
ily from 1950 to 1980. The equity share of  pooled funds appears to be sizable. 
1.4  A Profile of  Pension Participants 
In 1979 an estimated 30.2 of  67.3 million private sector workers were covered under 
private pension plans. Close to 70 percent of these 30.2 million were male, 89.36 percent 
were white, 56.36 percent were over age 40,40.13  percent had post-high school education, 
34.1  2 percent earned more than $1  5,000 per year, 49.89 percent were white collar workers, 
and 44.19 percent worked in manufacturing. The composition of  covered workers in the 
public sector is somewhat different. Of the 9.43 million 1979 public sector (state and local) 
covered workers, 49.24 percent were male, 87.1  8 percent were white, 44.09 percent were 
over age 40, 62.86 percent reported at least a high school education, and 30.99 percent 
earned more than $15,000 per year. 
The composition of  covered workers along many of these dimensions largely reflects 
differential coverage rates by demographic and economic characteristics. For example, in 
the private sector, male pension coverage was 52.9 percent in 1979 while female coverage 
was only 33.3 percent. For white workers, the 1979  coverage rate was 45.2, somewhat larger 
than the 41.9 rate for nonwhites.  Workers 46 years and older are more than 1.3 times as likely 
to  report pension coverage as their younger colleagues. Close to half of  private sector 
workers with a post-high  school education report pension coverage; only 42.77 percent of 
less educated workers  report coverage. Private sector workers with annual earnings in 
excess of  $15,000 are 2.19 times more likely to be covered by a pension than lower paid 
workers. For workers in white collar occupations the 1979 coverage rate is 46.55 percent, 
slightly larger than the 43.31 percent rate for  blue collar workers. 
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remainder are enrolled in defined  contribution  plans. Defined benefit  plans determine 
pension benefits on the basis of formulae that typically take into account the worker's years 
of  service, past earnings  history, and age  at  retirement. In defined  contribution  plans 
benefits equal the return of principal plus income earned on explicit pension fund contribu- 
tions made by, or for, each participating worker. 
Private pension plan participants are highly concentrated in large plans; 78.06 percent 
of participants belong to plans with 1,000 or more covered workers. Almost half of all private 
pension participants are enrolled in union plans. This statistic is striking when compared with 
a less than 25 percent union representation among the total private US.  work force. "Plan 
entity" is another important feature of pension plans. Private plans that cover workers of more 
than one employer-multiemployer  plans-cover  18.61 percent of  private pension partici- 
pants. 
While 44.87 percent of the US.  work force reported pension coverage in 1979, only 
21.43 percent indicated that they were vested. Almost one-fifth of covered workers indicated 
a lack of knowledge of their vested status. There is also a significant difference between 
male and female vesting rates. Covered female workers are 20 percent less likely to be 
vested than their covered male co-workers. The white-nonwhite differentials in vesting rates 
for covered workers are slightly smaller than the male-female differentials; 48.57 percent of 
white participants, but only 41.02 percent of  nonwhites surveyed in 1979 indicated their 
pension benefits were vested. The probability that a worker's benefits are vested is strongly 
correlated with age. Fewer than one-third of covered workers below age 30, but more than 
60 percent of  covered workers above age 50 are vested. 
1.5  A Profile of  Pension Beneficiaries 
In 1980, 6.64 million, or  19.94 percent, of  the 33.30 million Americans age 60 or over 
reported receipt of income from either private, state, or local pension plans. For individuals 
age 70 and over, the fraction reporting pension income was 27.37 percent. Almost three- 
quarters of the 6.64 million beneficiaries received private pensions. Of these beneficiaries 
18.47 percent were age 60 to 64; 31.93 percent were 65 to 69; 49.60 percent were 70 or 
older. Over 60 percent of private, state, and local beneficiaries were male; almost 94 percent 
were white. Although individuals with post-high  school education constitute only 18.08 
percent of these elderly cohorts, they represent 25.58 percent of private, state, and local 
pension recipients. Over 39.69 percent of the 1980  population of elderly individuals reported 
only a grammar school or junior high school education. These individuals account for only 
27.47 percent of the 1980 pension recipients. 
Pension recipients report greater than average levels of  lifetime earnings, but only 
average levels of current annual income. Across all age groups, 7.06 percent of the 1980 
elderly reported $20,000 or more in annual income. Among elderly pension recipients the 
fraction is only slightly higher, 7.53 percent. However, for the 70 and over age groups, 5.81 
percent of pension recipients reported $20,00Oor  more in income, almost twice the percent- 
age for the entire 70 and older age group. 
Pension recipients, as one expects, are much more likely to be out of the labor market 
than the typical elderly individual. The employment rate (fraction of population employed) of 
the post-60 population was 21.87 percent in 1980; for private, state, and local pension 
recipients it was only 12.33 percent. Apparently, for  many of  the elderly, the receipt of 
pension income is associated with a total cessation of employment. Thus, while pension 
coverage of  workers and the generosity of  their pension benefits is highly correlated with 
earnings, elderly pension beneficiaries in general report average levels of  income. 
There were22.26 million households  in 1980 headed by an individual age 600r older. In 
slightly  over  half  of  these  households, the  household head was  single.  Of  the  single 
households, over three-quarters  were headed by afemale. In 1980,35.49 percent of married 
households reported pension income; the comparable percentage was 23.82 for  single 
male-headed households and 19.36 for single female-headed households. Although mar- 
ried households constitute less than half of total elderly households, they account for 63.06 
percent of all 1980 households that received private, state, or local pension benefits. 6  Introduction 
1.6  The Structure of Private Pension Plans 
In 1980 there were an estimated 61 6,642 private pension plans in the United States, an 
enormous growth from the 14,671 plans in existence in 1951. Approximately 65 percent of 
these plans were defined  contribution, as  opposed  to  defined  benefit, plans.  Defined 
contribution plans are disproportionately small plans, however, and cover less than one- 
third of  private pension participants. Defined contribution plans average 34.17 covered 
workers, while defined benefit plans average 209.57 participants. Actually, most pension 
plans are fairly small. In 1977,  86.81 percent of defined contribution plans and 59.88 percent 
of  defined benefit plans reported fewer than 25 participants. Over two-thirds of  pension 
participants, however, are concentrated in the 5,000 largest plans that account for less than 
1.5 percent of  all plans. 
Union plans tend to be quite large, averaging 797 participants; although they make up 
only 5.25 percent of all plans, their participants constitute almost half of all private covered 
workers. Over 38 percent of  union participants are in multiemployer plans, and over 90 
percent of  multiemployer plan participants are union members. Multiemployer plans aver- 
age 859 participants and cover 18.61 percent of  private pension participants. 
Subject to minimum  standards established under the Employee Retirement Security Act 
of  1974 (ERISA), private pension plans are free to establish rules and requirements that 
govern participation, vesting, benefit accrual, ages of early and normal retirement,  as well as 
provisions for receipt of disability benefits. There are a host of provisions that meet ERISA's 
requirements. As a consequence, there are a wide variety of pension plans. A description of 
the structure of  U.S. plans requires examining each of the rules and requirements in turn. 
1.6.1  Pension Participation 
The initial date of pension plan participation determines, at a minimum,  the date beyond 
which workers are formally enrolled in the  plan and  included  in official  reports to the 
government. For purposes of computing benefit accrual the date of plan participation is also 
the latest date that the plan can use. Some plans appear to use an earlier date for benefit 
accrual, such as the date employment commences with the plan sponsor. 
About  50  percent  of  pension plans  specify  a  minimum age  requirement for  plan 
participation. Most of these plans specify a service requirement as well. For plans with age 
requirements, over half specify age 25 as the initial age of  participation; another 20 percent 
specify age 21. The plans specifying age 25 account for 72.56 percent of  all participants in 
plans with age requirements. Plans with service participation requirements represent 70.06 
percent of all plans. Virtually all plans with service requirements  specify3  years or less; plans 
with a one-year service requirement cover 87 percent of all workers in plans with a service 
requirement. Large plans often permit immediate participation. The 20.61 percent of pen- 
sion plans with no participation requirements cover over 51.1  7 percent of  pension partici- 
pants. 
Fewer than one-third of private pension plans restrict pension participation of elderly 
workers. These plans, however, cover 42.55 percent of all private pension participants. The 
maximum age for plan participation in these cases averages 61.78, where this average is 
weighted by the number of  covered workers. 
1.6.2  Vesting and Portability 
Vesting  provisions are  a  key  structural feature  of  pension plans. Vested  pension 
benefits are benefits to which the worker has a legal claim. Fewer than 4 percent of private 
covered workers are vested immediately. Slightly more than half are covered by 1  0-year 
"cliff vesting," which provides full vesting after 10 years of service, but no vesting prior to 10 
years. Another 16.32 percent of pension participants belong to plans with cliff vesting at 3 or 
5 years or with a partial, or "graded," vesting that specifies a schedule of  vesting accrual. 
Almost 5 percent of covered workers are in plans with 10  years of graded vesting. Under this 
formula a worker's vesting rights typically increase by 10 percent for each of the first 10  years 
of service. 7  1.6 The Structure of  Private Pension Plans 
Vesting provisions differ markedly across plan types and industries. Almost two-thirds 
of  defined benefit participants but fewer than one-quarter of defined contribution partici- 
pants belong to plans with 10-year cliff vesting. Over 13 percent of  defined contribution 
participants but only .62 percent of defined benefit participants enjoy immediate vesting. In 
wholesale trade 15.15 percent of participants face 1  0-year graded vesting; the comparable 
figure in mining is only 2.86 percent. 
Data from the Department of Labor's EBS1 file suggest a surprisingly large degree of 
pension portability. Portability means that a worker can switch jobs and continue pension 
participation under the original pension plan or under an equivalent pension plan that credits 
the worker's past service with the former employer. According to the EBSl data, close to half 
of  all pension participants  have portable  pensions. Over one-fifth have portability with 
employers who are not cosponsors of the pension plans. 
These figures should be viewed with considerable caution. They may in part reflect a 
confusion on the part of survey respondents as to whether the portability question really dealt 
with portability as opposed to vesting. On the other hand the correlation of portability with 
plan size suggests much more than simple coding errors. According to EBSl data, fewer 
than one-quarter of  participants  in small plans with  less than 25 participants  but over 
two-thirds of  participants  in plans with 10,000 or more covered workers appear to have 
portable pensions. This high degree of portability reported by larger plans may in part reflect 
the ability of  covered workers to carry service credits to related companies only-e.g. 
subsidiaries. In addition, industries such as  construction in which workers often switch 
companies report much greater than average rates of  portability. 
1.6.3  Benefif  Provisions 
As mentioned, over 70 percent of  pension participants are enrolled in defined benefit 
plans that base benefits on a specified formula. There are six  commonly used defined 
benefit formulae. Plans with these six formulae account for 86.25 percent of defined benefit 
participants. Roughly  two-fifths of the 86.25 percent of these defined benefit participants are 
enrolled  in plans that  relate benefits to  past  levels of  earnings. The  majority of  these 
participants have formulae that are integrated with social security. 
A large fraction of defined benefit participants, 43.02 percent, belong to plans that 
determine benefits independent of  earnings. Of  this 43.02 percent, 35.61 percent have 
benefits determined as a flat dollar amount related only to service. The other 7.14 percent 
receive a flat dollar  benefit, independent of  earnings or service. Since these formulae 
provide nominal payments independent of  general price or wage increases, they appear 
completely unindexed with respect to inflation that occurs during the workers' years of 
service. 
Two-thirds of plans specifying flat benefits independent of earnings are plans subject to 
collective bargaining agreements. These plans cover 79.76 percent of participants in plans 
with flat benefit formulae. Of the 10.07 million union participants subject to these benefit 
formulae, 3.88  million are members of multiemployer plans. Many of the flat benefit, multiem- 
ployer plans appear to be Taft-Hartley plans that combine features both of defined benefit 
and of defined contribution pensions. For these plans the erosion of  real benefits due to 
inflation during the workers' years of  service may be less significant. Under Taft-Hartley 
plans, employers make defined contributions to a trust that is, typically, jointly managed by 
the union and the employer. For ongoing plans, total payments to beneficiaries are typically 
determined by contributions to the trust fund and by the fund's investment performance. 
Trust fund assets are paid out to retired workers over time in the form of flat payments that 
may or may not be related to service. As additional contributions are made to the fund, its 
managers periodically may increase the designated dollar benefit amount in their benefit 
formula. From the perspective of workers as a group, then, many ongoing Taft-Hartley plans 
appear  to  operate  much  like defined  contribution  plans.  From the  perspective  of  the 
individual worker, however, these plans may more closely resemble defined benefit plans 
than defined contribution plans. This  depends on the frequency of  increases in benefit 
amounts. To  the extent that  revisions in benefit amounts occur  infrequently over time, 8  Introduction 
particular workers may be absorbing a substantial inflation risk with respect to the real level 
of  their first benefit check. 
Even if individual benefits are adjusted on an annual basis, Taft-Hartley plans may still 
differ from defined contribution plans. In the case of pension plan termination, a Taft-Hartley 
plan, like a standard defined benefit plan, may face legal liabilities that exceed the current 
value of the plan's trust fund. Vested workers in such circumstances are treated like defined 
benefit participants rather than defined contribution participants. 
The  proportion of  defined  benefit participants covered  by formulae  not related to 
earnings rises rapidly with plan size. In plans with 10,000or  more participants, 48.49 percent 
of participants are covered by such formulae; the corresponding percentage for plans with 
fewer than 50 covered workers is less than 4. The fraction of defined benefit participants 
covered by social security integrated benefit formulae rises from 31.8 percent for plans with 
100 to 250 workers to 38.5 percent for plans with 10,000  or more workers. There is also 
considerable variation in the use of  particular formulae across industries; 68.75 percent of 
defined benefit participants in finance, insurance, and real estate but only 5.36 percent of 
such participants in construction have social security integrated formulae. 
There seems to be great variation in the rate at which pension benefits replace pre- 
retirement wages depending on the type of  benefit formula in use. Based on 1977 plan 
provisions, a hypothetical worker retiring in 1977 with 35 years of  service and $10,000 in 
earnings at the end of his or her career would have received, on average, $2,254 among 
plans specifying the unit benefit formula. This formula computes annual benefits as a fixed 
percent of  a specified earnings base multiplied by years of  service. Among  plans with 
formulae specifying a flat benefit related only to service, the benefit would have averaged 
$3,385. 
Replacement rates also vary depending on the participant's salary level. These varia- 
tions occur chiefly because of plan provisions for social security integration. While Internal 
Revenue Service regulations do not permit qualified pension plans to discriminate in favor of 
highly paid workers, they do  allow plans to  integrate their  benefit formulae with social 
security in order to counteract social security's provision of  higher replacement rates for 
lower paid workers. Other factors held constant, plans with integrated formulae tend to 
provide higher replacement rates at higher levels of earnings. Among plans with a social 
security offset formula, for example, a hypothetical worker with 35 years of service and a final 
salary of $40,000 would receive, on average, $1  5,597, corresponding to a replacement rate 
of 38.99 percent. If the same worker retired with a final salary of $1  0,000,  however, his (her) 
benefit would average $2,116 and his (her) replacement rate would be only 21.16 per~ent.'~ 
For  plans that do base benefits on earnings, the choice of  the earnings base can 
significantly affect the worker's ultimate replacement rate. Across all earnings-based benefit 
formulae, the average replacement rate  for a 1977 retiree  earning $20,000 prior to retirement 
is 38.85 percent in plans using a final or  highest three years' earnings base; it is 14.79 
percent for plans using a career average earnings base. 
The replacement rates for hypothetical 1977 retirees differ significantly across indus- 
tries. For  earnings related formulae, the $20,000 average replacement rate was  18.92 
percent in retail trade and 41.91 percent in finance, insurance, and real estate. The $20,000 
replacement rate for non-earnings  related formulae averaged 11.4 percent in manufactur- 
ing, but 21.60 percent in construction. 
The replacement rates for hypothetical retirees in nonunion plans are larger than those 
for union plans for earnings related formulae, but smaller for non-earnings related formulae. 
These average replacement rates for hypothetical retirees conveniently summarize a 
number of features of pension benefit formulae and demonstrate  the sensitivity  of these rates 
to the level of earnings and choice of earnings base. Whether certain industries or union 
plans or plans of  a particular size, etc., actually provide lower than average replacement 
rates depends on the joint distribution of  earnings, earnings bases, and benefit formulae 
across these pension plan characteristics. New Department of  Labor data that permit the 
calculation of actual 1978 replacement rates suggest minor differences in replacement rates 
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receipt of  pension benefits. Early retirees typically  have larger replacement rates than 
normal retirees, reflecting a greater number of  years of  service with the plan sponsor. 
1.6.4  Normal and Early Retirement 
Almost 90 percent of pension participants are members of plans that specify a minimum 
age for normal retirement. This age averages approximately 65. In one-quarter of pension 
plans, covering 45.14 percent of  all participants, there is also a service requirement for 
normal  retirement, averaging  close  to  5 years on a  participant-weighted  basis. There 
appears to be relatively little variation in these requirements across plan type, plan size, 
industry, union status, and plan entity. 
A surprisingly large fraction of  private plans, 35.9 percent, do not permit early retire- 
ment. These plans, however, cover only 17.8 percent of participants. In the case of defined 
benefit  plans  only  11.62 percent  of  participants  are completely  precluded from early 
retirement. The typical early retirement age is 56. The typical service requirement for early 
retirement is about twelve and one-half years and affects over three-quarters of covered 
workers with an early retirement option. 
Virtually all private pension participants who retire early may have their benefits spe- 
cially reduced as a result of retiring early. For over 40 percent of participants, the application 
of a special benefit reduction depends on the age at early retirement and/or the worker's 
length of service. For the remaining set of  potenfial retirees, a special benefit reduction is 
always applied for permissible retirement prior to the plan's normal retirement age. Certain 
plans, particularly those integrated with social security, provide supplemental early retire- 
ment benefits until the worker is eligible to begin collecting social security. 
The plan's normal retirement age certainly demarcates the age beyond which a worker 
is free to retire and suffer no special benefit reduction. The normal retirement age can also 
determine the age at which benefit accrual ceases. For close to half of  private pension 
participants, the normal retirement age only serves to make the former distinction; i.e. close 
to half of  private pension participants can continue to accrue pension benefits beyond the 
plan's normal retirement age. Another 29.75 percent of participants are in plans that permit 
benefit accrual only until the employee reaches a specified age and/or has completed a 
specified  length of  service. The  remainder of  participants  are in plans that  permit no 
additional benefit accrual if the employee continues to work after satisfying the requirements 
for normal retirement. 
1.6.5  Cost of  Living Adjustments and Disability Provisions 
Cost of  living increases appear to be an important feature of  many private pension 
plans. While few plans have provisions for automatic cost of living increases after retirement, 
most large plans periodically extend ad hoc increases to their retirees. In the period from 
1976 to 1979, roughly two-thirds of large private pension plans extended increases averag- 
ing 21.88 percent, which is equivalent to roughly half of the rise in the Consumer Price Index 
over the same period. 
Close to three-quarters of private pension plans, covering 84.1  1 percent of participants, 
provide disability coverage to their workers.  The percentage varies across industries, from a 
high of 93.84 percent in construction to a low of 67.23 percent in finance, insurance, and real 
estate. Over two-thirds of participants covered by disability provisions face rather rigorous 
requirements for receipt of  disability benefits. To receive disability benefits virtually all of 
these workers face service requirements  that average 11.43  years. For a third of workers with 
disability service requirements, the service requirement is 15 years. 
1.7  The Structure of State and Local Pension Plans 
1.7.1  Participation 
In contrast to private pension plans, state and local plans rarely have requirements for 
participation. In state-administered plans, only 9.05 percent of participants belong to plans 10  Introduction 
that restrict entrance on the basis of age and/or service. The percentage for large-city plans 
is 1.51; it is .61 for other large local plans and 27.48 for  small local plans. Where such 
restrictions arise, the average age and service requirements are similar to those of private 
plans in the case of  small local plans and somewhat smaller in the case of state, city, and 
other large local plans. While almost one-third of private pension plans prohibit participation 
of  workers beyond a certain age, the  comparable fraction for  public  plans  is roughly 
one-f  ifth. 
The federal government does not regulate state and local pension systems. Unlike 
private plans, therefore, public plans need not vest workers' benefits. Despite the lack of 
federal regulation, all state-administered and large-city plans as well as all other large local 
plans in the NBER  1978 City and Large Local Pension Survey (CLLPS)  report vesting 
provisions. However, almost one-third of small local systems covering close to one-quarter 
of all participants in small local plans provide no vesting. On average, state-administered 
plans  require about three fewer years of  service for  full vesting than do private plans. 
Large-city and other large local plans require roughly an equivalent length of service for full 
vesting, while those small local plans that permit vesting require, on average, almost four 
more years of  service than private plans. Public pension systems seem to use cliff vesting 
exclusively. None of the public plans we encountered in this study reported gradual, or 
"graded,  " vesting . 
1  .7.2  Benefit Provisions 
Virtually all state and local pension plans are defined benefit plans. However, some of 
these plans provide additional defined contribution benefits based on special employee 
contributions. Relatively few of the benefit formulae in the public defined benefit plans are 
integrated with social security. In the case of  state-administered plans, for example, only 
15.60 percent of  participants  are enrolled in integrated plans. For  large-city plans the 
percentage is 27.64; it is 5.36 for other large public systems and 7.80 for small local systems. 
For private plans the percentage is 37.57. Part of the explanation for this difference is simply 
that  many state and  local  governments do  not  participate in social security.  In  1980 
approximately 37 percent of  state-administered pension participants and 51 percent of 
large-city pension and other large local pension participants were not covered by social 
security at their public sector job. 
All public defined benefit plans surveyed in this book use past earnings to compute 
retirement benefits. State systems rely to a great extent on the unit benefit formula that 
determines benefits as a fixed percentage of  a specified earnings base multiplied by the 
length of  service. Almost two-thirds of  state-administered pension plan participants  are 
covered by this formula. The fraction is also quite large-80.53  percent-for  large local 
plans other than large-city plans. 
The substantial use of terminal years' earnings in computing the defined benefit earn- 
ings base significantly reduces the sensitivity of real public pension benefits to inflation that 
occurs during a worker's years of service. For over 80 percent of public pension participants, 
the earnings base is determined as the average of the highest five final years of earnings. In 
the case of private plans, over one-quarter of the 43.50 percent of defined benefit partici- 
pants with earnings-based benefits receive pensions based on a career average of  earn- 
ings. 
Public pension plans appear to offer much more generous pension benefits than private 
plans. In the case of state-administered plans, for example, a hypothetical worker retiring in 
1977 with a final salary of $20,000 would have received an annual benefit equal to 57.00 
percent of his (her) final salary. In the case of  private defined benefit plans the average 
earnings related benefit replacement rate for a $20,000 retiree in 1977 is only 29.39 percent. 
The proposition that public pensions are more generous than private pensions is supported 
by 7980 Current Populations Survey data indicating average benefits of $3,850 for 65- to 
69-year-old male private pension recipients, but $4,654 for the corresponding state and 
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$1,789, compared with public benefits for females of $3,850. Pension benefits constitute 
less than 30 percent of the total income of private recipients. In contrast, public pension 
recipients in this age group receive roughly 40 percent of their income from pensions. 
1.7.3  Normal and Early Retirement 
Over 85 percent of all public systems and 100 percent of state-administered systems 
and other large local plans in the NBER CLLPS (1  978) survey specify an age requirement  for 
normal retirement. For state, large-city, other large local, and small local plans, the partici- 
pant-weighted normal retirement ages average 60.1  1, 58.75, 62.44, and 62.55, respec- 
tively. The average normal retirement age for  private plans is 64.71. Over half of  public 
pension participants must satisfy service as well as age requirements to qualify for normal 
retirement. These service requirements average 10.10, 11.25, 14.15, and 15.09 years for 
state, large-city, other large local, and small local systems, respectively. In the case of 
large-city and small local plans, 9.09 and 13.1  6 percent of participants, respectively, face 
only a service requirement to qualify for receipt of  normal retirement benefits. For both types 
of  systems the average service requirement is 20 years. 
With the exception of small local plans, the vast majority of public pension participants 
belong to plans with provisionsfor early retirement;  96.54 percent of state participants, 66.1  6 
percent of large-city participants, 85.82 percent of  other large local participants, but only 
51  54  percent of small local participants have early retirement options. In the case of private 
pensions, 82.20 percent of participants are covered by early retirement provisions. For all 
four public pension groups the mean (participant-weighted) early retirement age, when one 
is specified, is roughly 54. The mean (participant-weighted) service requirement of plans 
specifying a service requirement ranges from 51  years in state plans to 1.23 years in small 
local plans. In private plans the early retirement age averages 56 while the mean service 
requirement is about 12 years. 
1.8  The Financial Status of  Private, State, and Local Pension Plans 
Pension funds and pension reserves of  insurance companies  represent a growing 
repository of  national savings. The 1980 value of  these savings was $650.7 billion, or 6 
percent of total 1980 private sector net worth. Private pensions accounted for 69.24 percent 
of these assets. The current and future pension benefits that must be financed in part by 
these assets are equally sizable. For example, in 1980, 497 of the nation’s largest corpora- 
tions reported vested accrued liabilities  of $1  37.1  0 billion. Estimates of 1978  vested accrued 
state and local pension liabilities ranged from $1 35.6 billion (assuming a 12 percent interest 
rate) to $1 79.2 billion (assuming an 8 percent interest rate). 
Measurement of these and other liability concepts is highly sensitive to the choice of 
interest rate used to discount future benefit streams, to projected rates of employee wage 
growth, and to assumptions about worker longevity and employment separation. Even if 
measurement were straightforward, there would still be major conceptual questions con- 
cerning the appropriate definition of pension liabilities. Two definitions considered in this 
book are accrued and projected liabilities. Accrued liabilities are essentially “shutdown” 
liabilities. They equal benefit obligations a plan would face if it terminated operation and paid 
off vested and, in the case of total accrued liabilities, unvested benefits using only past 
service and past levels of  earnings to compute benefits. Projected liabilities equal the 
present expected value of  benefits payable to  current participants, assuming the  plan 
continues  in operation and that service and earnings of  active participants increase at 
projected rates. Projected liabilities look to the future, while accrued liabilities are based 
solely on past experience. 
The vested accrued liability concept may be most appealing to members of the legal 
profession, since it corresponds most closely to an enforceable legal claim. However, in 
certain circumstances,  unvested accrued benefits also  represent legal liabilities of  the 
pension fund. Under ERISA, unvested accrued liabilities are residual claims on a terminating 12  Introduction 
private plan, provided that plan assets exceed the plan's vested accrued liabilities. Total 
and vested accrued liab  es are currently reported by most major corporations in accord- 
ance with the 1980 recommendation of  the Financial Acounting Standards Board. 
Actuaries often consider legal definitions of pension liabilities too narrow  for purposes of 
judging the appropriate  degree of  pension funding or the true economic claim on plan 
sponsors.  Legal  pension  claims-vested  accrued  benefits  and,  potentially,  unvested 
accrued benefits-are  paid, in practice, only in the case of  plan termination. For ongoing 
pension plans that provide rapid growth in pension benefits as the worker accumulates more 
service and/or earns a larger wage, the assets required to fund projected liabilities will 
exceed those required to fund accrued  liabilities based on  past service and earnings 
experience. 
Economists also find projected liability concepts interesting. For ongoing plans, pro- 
jected benefits may represent implicit, if not legal, claims on plan sponsors. Contractual 
models of  labor market behavior view workers and employers as entering into long-term 
agreements in which the worker provides a time path of labor services in exchange for a time 
path of total compensation. Within these models there need be little or no relation between 
this year's labor effort and this year's compensation. For example, young workers who 
consider joining a particular firm will consider the firm's projected pension benefit offer as 
well as its projected path of nonpension compensation in making their decision. In contrast 
to this contractual view of labor markets, traditional spot labor market theories predict that 
new hires consider only their immediate wage and accrued pension compensation. For 
young workers covered by plans with long service requirements for vesting, the value of 
immediate pension accrual may be zero. Hence, in the context of contractual labor markets, 
projected pension benefits simply represent one component of the employer's long-term 
compensation obligation, and projected rather than accrued liabilities are most relevant for 
considering the interactions of  pensions and economic behavior. 
Another example of the economic importance of  projected, as opposed to accrued, 
liabilities involves the financial valuation of the plan sponsor's enterprise. If employers have 
effectively committed themselves to a long-term level of  worker compensation 
projected pension benefits, it is projected rather than accrued unfunded liab 
represent a claim on the plan sponsor's nonpension assets and future profits. 
fund assets may provide little information about potential pension default. By assumption, 
the employer is committed to meeting all explicit and implicit compensation commitments. 
Hence, if pension fund assets are inadequate to meet projected pension liabilities, the firm 
will use its other assets to cover the difference. Therefore, while the size of  unfunded 
projected pension liabilities is not necessarily indicative of the probability of default, it does 
indicate the size of the implicit lien on the employer's nonpension assets. 
Choice of  an appropriate pension liability concept is also an important problem for 
government officials charged with  oversight of  pension tax  treatment. Contributions to 
pension funds are deductible by the employer and therefore reduce the employer's current 
corporate or  personal income tax liability. Excess contributions to  pension funds are a 
potential mechanism for deferring taxation of the employer's profits. Such excess contribu- 
tions defer rather than eliminate tax liabilities because future repatriation of excess assets 
from the pension fund to the employer are taxable to the employer. Another tax advantage of 
pension funds that may lead to overfunding relative  to a reasonable, although not necessar- 
ily legal, standard is that capital income on pension fund investments accumulates free of 
tax. One way in which plan sponsors might attempt to minimize  their tax liabilities is to borrow 
money to fully fund or, if possible, overfund their true underlying pension liabilities. Assuming 
these funds can be invested at rates comparable to those at which the initial loan is secured, 
the plan sponsor receives interest deductions on corporate or personal taxable income, but 
receives interest, or other forms of capital income, tax free through the pension fund. The 
extent to which this type of tax avoidance occurs is poorly understood, as is the potential for 
repatriation of  excess assets from the pension trust fund. 
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If one considers vested accrued liabilities as the relevant measure  of pension indebted- 
ness, the majority of  pension plans of  major U.S. corporations appear to be adequately 
funded, if not overfunded, according to their own official reports. The 1980  annual reports of 
497 of the Fortune 1,000 largest US.  corporations include estimates of total accrued and 
vested accrued pension liabilities. They also list the 1980 market value of  pension fund 
assets available to  meet these liabilities. Across all 497  corporations vested  accrued 
liabilities totaled $137.10 billion while pension fund assets equaled $133.3 billion. For over 
half of these corporations, pension fund assets exceed vested accrued liab 
corporations reported assets that were twice the value of their vested accrued liabilities. 
7 corporations had assets representing less than 50 percent of their vested 
es,  and two of  these  corporations have only  recently established their 
Chrysler rank first and second in terms of  largest 1980 unfunded 
. These unfunded liabilities are $4.08 and $1.28 billion, respec- 
tively. General Motors' $13.35 billion of assets represent, however, 77 percent of its $1  7.44 
billion vested accrued liabilities. Chrysler's $1.75 billion pension assets, on the other hand, 
are only 58 percent of its $3.02 billion vested accrued liability. In this sample the corporation 
with the largest excess of assets over vested accrued liabilities is Western Electric with a 
$1.67 billion vested accrued pension surplus. To place these figures in some perspective, 
Chrysler's 1980 unfunded vested liability per employee is $9,566; Western Electric's corre- 
sponding surplus per employee is $9,435. 
sense of the relation between projected and accrued liabilities may be obtained by compar- 
ing the present volume's estimates of these two liability concepts in the case of state and 
local pension plans. For state-administered, large-city, other large local, and small local 
plans the ratios of  projected to vested accrued liabilities are 2.35, 1.78, 2.13, and 2.70, 
respectively, discounting at a 12 percent nominal rate. Using an 8 percent nominal rate, 
these ratios are 2.23, 1.77, 2.06, and 2.51, respectively. Application of  the highest and 
lowest of these ratios, 2.70 and 1.77, to the $137.10 billion vested accrued liabilities of the 
497 corporations in the NBER Fortune 1,000  samples leads to projected liability estimates 
ranging from $370.1  7 billion to $242.67 billion for these companies. The corresponding 
range of  estimates of  unfunded projected liabilities is $236.87 billion to $1  09.37 billion. 
Under the assumption that  projected liabilities for  these corporations are twice vested 
accrued liabilities, as many as 231 of the 497 corporations may be less than 50 percent 
funded with respect to projected liabilities. 
Appraisal  of  the financial condition of  state and local pension plans is also highly 
dependent on the definition of  pension liabilities and the method used to measure these 
liabilities. Chapter 7 presents estimates of accrued (total and vested) and projected liabili- 
ties for different long-term rates of inflation. Nominal interest rates are assumed to rise point 
for point with inflation. The nominal interest rate is taken to equal a 3 percent real rate plus the 
assumed rate of inflation. This assumption in conjunction with actual nonindexed state and 
local benefit formulae as well as less than complete cost of living adjustments of recipient's 
benefits makes liability estimates highly sensitive to inflation. 
For 1978 the estimated value of total accrued liabilities of state-administered pension 
plans is $137.84 billion calculated using an 8 percent interest rate. Use of  a 12 percent 
interest rate lowers the estimate of these liabilities to $100.43 billion. The 1978 value of total 
state pension assets equaled $125.18 billion, 90.81 percent of  the 8 percent liability but 
124.64  percent of the 12 percent liability.  As a group, then, state pensions are more than fully 
funded assuming a 12 percent interest rate and over 90 percent funded assuming an 8 
percent interest rate. 
In general, large-city pension systems and other large local systems are somewhat less 
well funded with respect to total accrued liab  es than are state plans. In 1979 the twenty 
cities with the largest number of pension participants reported combined assets of $20.34 
billion. These  assets  represented 67.50 percent  and  83.39 percent  of  large-city  total 
pension plans. 
While the 1980 corporate annual reports do not report projected liab 14  Introduction 
accrued liabilities calculated at 8 and 12 percent interest rates, respectively. For other large 
local pension plans, combined 1979 assets of $3.1  7 billion covered 74.96 percent and 98.23 
percent of total accrued liabilities at respective interest rates of  8 and 12 percent. 
Small local plans, as  a group, are much more poorly funded than the other public 
pension systems. Assuming an 8 percent interest rate, a random sample of  public pension 
plans with 500  or fewer  participants  are 47.23 percent unfunded with  respect to total 
accrued liabilities; they are 63.91 percent unfunded using a 12 percent interest rate. 
While public pension plans in the aggregate appear fairly well funded in terms of  total 
accrued liabilities, there is considerable heterogeneity across pension plans. Based on an 8 
percent interest rate, for example, seven state plans are less than 50 percent funded with 
respect to total accrued liabilities, twelve states have funding ratios between .5 and .75, 
eighteen states fall between .75 and 1, and thirteen states are more than fully funded. The 
corresponding  funding ratios for  large cities range from essentially zero in the case of 
Indianapolis to 1.61 in the case of  Milwaukee. For other large local plans and small local 
plans the dispersion in funding rates of accrued liabilities is equally significant. Part of this 
dispersion may, however, reflect the use of a uniform  wage distribution by age and service in 
these actuarial calculations. 
The financial condition of public employee pension systems appears much poorer from 
the perspective of projected liabilities. In contrast to a $1 37.84 billion total accrued liability at 
an 8 percent interest rate, the 1978 projected liability of state plans computed at the same 
interest rate is $294.87 billion. State pension assets in 1978 of $125.18 billion represented 
less than 43 percent of projected liabilities. For large-city plans, projected liabilities exceed 
total accrued  liabilities by a factor of  1.36 under both 8 and  12 percent  interest rate 
assumptions. Similar ratios apply for  other large local and small local pension systems. 
Under the projected liability definition of  pension obligations, 74.00 percent of  state plans, 
52.27 percent of large-city plans, and 75.89 percent of other large local plans are less than 
50 percent funded assuming an 8 percent interest rate. 
1.9  Pensions in the American Economy: 
Problems and Prospects 
The statistics in this volume raise a number of concerns about the performance of the 
U.S. pension system in providing old age income security to American workers. One issue is 
the complexity of pension provisions. While the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 has substantially standardized pension provisions, considerable latitude remains in 
the choice of plan features. A typical worker today might face age and service restrictions  on 
plan participation, agraduated  vesting schedule, portability with a specified set of copartici- 
pating employers, a social security step-rate integrated benefit formula, an optional peak 
years or terminal years earnings base, age- and service-specific early retirement benefit 
reduction rates, supplemental early retirement benefits, partial actuarial increases in ben- 
efits for work beyond the plan's normal retirement  age, and limited cost of living adjustments. 
Additional features would establish the worker's eligibility for disability benefits as well as the 
level of those benefits. Each of these provisions can significantly influence the employee's 
expected pension compensation. In addition to digesting a host of  rules and regulations 
relating to structural features of the pension plan, an informed worker should be familiar with 
the pension plan's financial condition since pension plan default can wipe out  pension 
claims of unvested workers and reduce a vested worker's expected pension compensation 
by the difference between projected and accrued benefits. 
An informed worker should also understand the investment decisions of  the pension 
fund's portfolio manager. In the case of defined contribution plans these decisions directly 
influence the worker's expected retirement benefit as well as its variance, since the pension 
fund manager is, quite simply, investing the worker's money. In the case of defined plans, 
pension fund investment decisions influence the probability of  plan default. 
Even given complete knowledge of the plan's structural features and its financial status, 
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of  receiving that compensation is difficult  at best. The worker needs to formulate fairly 
precise expectations about the course of inflation and real interest rates: he (she) needs to 
understand the set of probab  es that determine both life expectancy and the chances of 
experiencing employment termination prior to retirement age; finally, the worker needs to be 
able to actuarially discount future benefit streams and assess their risk with  respect to 
variations in the  inflation rate, potential changes  in employment conditions, and other 
factors. 
The complexity of  pension provisions also poses difficult problems for employers. To 
"meet the market" in terms of total worker compensation, the employer must appreciate the 
value of nonwage as well as wage compensation being offered by his (her) competitors and 
be able to assess the increment to total compensation associated with his (her) own pension 
plan. The free market presumably alleviates some of the employer's informational problems 
associated with pensions. For example, employers may not need to understand precisely 
how 10-year as opposed to 5-year cliff vesting affects workers' perceptions of their total 
compensation offer. Employers can, in principle, experiment with different components of 
their compensation package until they attract the requisite quantity and quality of  workers. 
But this line of argument ultimately  throws the informational  requirements back to the worker. 
Workers need to be able to assess the relative attractiveness of  different pension plans in 
order to arbitrage differentials in total compensation across employers. 
The limited data available on worker familiarity with pension plan provisions provide 
some basis for  concern. In 1980, 8.05 percent of  U.S.  private wage and salary workers 
responded "don't know" to a US.  Census survey asking whether they were covered by a 
pension. Of those workers who reported pension coverage, almost one in five did not know 
whether their pension was vested. The "don't know" response to the vesting question was 
given by 27.85 percent of workers age 18 to 25, but only 12.43 percent of covered workers 
age 56 to 60. These rates are sufficiently high to suggest even more limited knowledge by 
workers of  precise provisions of  benefit formulae: retirement requirements, cost of  living 
adjustments; and the like. 
Additional research is needed to determine the full extent of  informational problems in 
the pension area. If there is a significant lack of  information, how does this fact affect the 
efficient operation of  the U.S. labor market and what are the distributional implications of 
these informational problems with  respect to wages and profits? The answers to these 
questions are of interest to all Americans, even those who never anticipate participating in a 
pension plan. As a nation, we are providing sizable tax incentives to saving in the form of 
pensions. Official estimates place the 1980 revenue losses to the U.S. Treasuryfrom pension 
savings incentives at $36.7 billion, or $229 per adult American.16  Is the current structure of 
the U.S. pension system delivering the saving and labor market results that are commensu- 
rate with this national investment? If not, what public policy approaches are needed to 
strengthen the US. pension system in meeting these objectives? 
A second area of  concern suggested by this study is the extreme sensitivity of  real 
pension benefits to inflation. A recent study by Dr. Robert Clark based on newly available 
Department of Labor data indicates that most beneficiaries, particularly those in large plans, 
can expect some type of cost of  living adjustment, although not necessarily on an annual 
basis. On average, cost of living adjustments  actually awarded fall far short of fully protecting 
the  real value of  private  pension benefits. During the  period  1973 to  1979, years that 
witnessed a 63 percent increase in the Consumer Price Index, mean nominal pensions for 
beneficiaries  in Dr. Clark's sample rose by 22.04 percent. For these  beneficiaries real 
benefits fell by 25.27 percent over the period." 
Approximately 55 percent of state and local pension plans explicitly specify partial or 
total cost of living adjustments. Despite this fact the estimates in chapter 7 indicate that an 
increase in inflation by 4 percentage points can reduce the real value of  state, large-city, 
other  large local, and small local vested accrued  pension benefits by 24 percent, 31 
percent, 22 percent, and 19 percent, respectively. 
Unexpected changes in the economy's long-term rate of inflation  can affect a recipient's 
initial real pension benefit and changes in the level of real benefits during retirement years. In 16  Introduction 
1979, 14 percent of  private defined benefit plans covering 27 percent of  active pension 
participants specified benefit formulae that potentially make the real level of the first year's 
pension benefit quite risky to inflation occurring during the participant's working years. One 
example is a defined benefit plan that computes the worker's pension on the basis of  a 
lifetime average of  nominal earnings. Assuming the worker's nominal earnings just keep 
pace with  inflation, every  percentage  point of  inflation prior to the worker's retirement 
devalues (in real terms) the value of  earnings received at the beginning of  the worker's 
career and therefore lowers the real value of average lifetime earnings. For plans using this 
earnings base, a lower real value of average lifetime earnings means a smaller initial real 
benefit received by the worker. Assuming the plan provides no cost of  living adjustments, 
real pension benefit payments will further decline at the rate of inflation during each year of 
retirement. 
The real losses or gains to pension participants and beneficiaries due to inflation are 
associated dollar for dollar with real gains or losses to the employer. Hence a decline in the 
inflation rate can quickly turn what would otherwise be a quite solvent pension fund into an 
acutely underfunded pension system. According to estimates reported here, 201 of 363 
state, large-city, and large local plans have assets in excess of 75 percent of vested accrued 
pension liabilities assuming a 9 percent long-term inflation rate (1  2 percent nominal interest 
rate). At a 5 percent inflation rate (8 percent nominal interest rate), only 171 of these 363 
public plans have assets that exceed 75 percent of their vested accrued liabilities. While no 
comparable data have yet been developed to determine the sensitivity of  private defined 
benefit pension finances to inflation, there is every reason to expect a similar degree of 
inflation sensitivity. 
The apparent lack of explicit arrangements  to pool these inflation risks between workers 
and employers does not preclude the possibility of implicit risk pooling arrangements.  These 
can take the form of periodic revisions of pension benefit formulae that affect current as well 
as future workers. Additional longitudinal data are needed to determine the frequency of 
revisions of inflation-sensitive benefit formulae. But evidence of benefit revisions would not, 
by itself, lessen concern about inflation risk; one also needs to determine that such revisions 
are not effectively paid for in the form of  lower nonpension compensation. 
Another way in which workers and employers can hedge these inflation risks is to 
purchase assets whose real return is positively correlated with inflation in the case of workers 
and is negatively correlated with inflation in the case of  employers. For example, pension 
participants with home mortgages or  other nominal liabilities gain from a rise in inflation 
because they can repay their debts in cheaper dollars; this real capital gain on their nominal 
debt from inflation may partly or totally offset inflation's reduction in the real value of  nominal 
pension benefits. Similarly, employers can hold nominal assets whose real value falls with 
inflation, thus offsetting employers' gains from paying lower real pension benefits. 
In short, the American pension system appears highly sensitive to inflation. Implicit 
insurance arrangements may in effect be redistributing the gains and losses arising from 
changes in the rate of inflation, but as yet there is no compelling evidence that such is the 
case. Alternatively, workers and employers may be self-insuring against pension-inflation 
risks by adjusting their private portfolios, but the extent of such behavior is not well under- 
stood. 
A third general question concerning pensions and economic performance involves the 
impact of  pensions on worker retirement. The years 1950 to 1980 witnessed a remarkable 
decline in the labor supply of the elderly. In 1950, 25 percent of Americans age 65 and over 
participated in the labor force;'* in 1980 that figure was roughly 12 percent.lg  Labor force 
participation rates of 55- to 64-year-olds dropped from 70 percent in 1960 to 60 percent in 
1979,'O  Not only are there proportionately fewer late middle aged and elderly Americans 
currently working in the U.S. economy, but those who do work are working fewer hours. In 
1957, 21  percent of employees over age 65 worked part-time;'' the 1980 figure was 43 
percent." 
The Social Security System's earnings test potentially imposes a heavy implicit tax on 
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early retiremenLZ3  Structural features of  many U.S. pension plans, however, also impose 
major penalties for continued work effort with the current employer. Because of the difficul- 
ties of changing jobs late in life, private, state, and local pension plans may be inducing 
millions of  elderly workers to leave the labor force. The mechanism by which the Social 
Security System and many pension plans induce retirement after these system’s retirement 
ages is simply not to fully compensate the worker for forgoing current receipt of  pension 
income. 
In 1979, 22.76 percent of  workers participated in plans that did not credit additional 
years of service beyond normal retirement for purposes of  computing retirement benefits. 
Another 28.55 percent of  covered workers were enrolled in plans that credited additional 
service after the normal retirement age only up to a specified age, on average, 70. Even for 
plans that credit service for some or all years after normal retirement,  the increase in future 
pension benefits associated with continued work may not adequately compensate for the 
forfeit of current benefits. The degree to which additional years of credited service constitute 
the equivalent of an actuarial increase in accrued pension benefits depends on the particu- 
lars of the plan’s benefit formulae and, in many cases, the worker’s rate of  nominal wage 
growth. 
Workers whose continued employment after additional years of service is no longer 
credited usually receive no special  reward for  delaying receipt of their benefits. Three- 
quarters of  covered workers participate in plans that provide neither for current benefit 
payments nor for increases in future benefits to workers whose additional years of service 
are no longer being credited. For workers in this situation, an additional year of employment 
with the plan sponsor means a complete loss of that year’s pension benefit. This feature 
obviously provides a healthy inducement to discontinue employment with the plan sponsor. 
Incentives for job separation can also be significant prior to the worker’s attainment of 
the plan’s normal retirement age. Once the worker passes the age at which early retirement 
benefits are first available, there is often a disincentive to continue employment with the plan 
sponsor. Many plans allow their participants to retire early with no reduction in their accrued 
benefits. Among plans that do apply a reduction, the reduction is often less than actuarial, 
causing workers who continue working for the plan sponsor to suffer a net loss measured in 
present value. Almost  one-quarter of  1979 private covered workers were  in plans that 
specified “actuarial increases” for delaying retirement. The remaining participants were in 
plans that provided special increases  that are apparently quite small relative  to an actuarially 
fair increase. On the basis of a 5 percent interest rate assumption and 1971 group mortality 
tables, McGill (1979) indicates that, between age 62 and age 65, the benefit increase 
needed to insure actuarial fairness is 24.8 percent. For private pension participants with 
nonactuarial benefit increase formulae, the rate of benefit increase between ages 62 and 65 
averages 8.2 percent. While other features of a plan’s regular benefit formula can provide 
benefit increases for additional service, these data suggest that many pension participants 
face significant work disincentives even prior to the plan’s normal retirement age. 
Many economists argue that there are sensible and compelling reasons for firms to 
induce retirement  through their benefit provisions.  After a certain age the worker’s productiv- 
ity may drop below his (her) current wage. In this case the worker may prefer to retire rather 
than continue to work at a wage commensurate with his (her) diminished abilities. Inducing 
retirement through implicit pension benefit taxation is seen as a way to terminate the worker 
while preserving his or her dignity. Other economists (Lazear 1981, 1982 in particular) view 
these retirement incentives as part of  an elaborate long-term contractual relationship in 
which the firm enforces diligence by paying the worker less than he (she) is worth when 
young and more than he (she) is worth when old. Tilting the age-compensation schedule in 
this manner keeps workers on their toes by providing greater and greater incentives to 
continue employment. It also permits the firm to pay higher wages than would otherwise be 
the case. After some optimal point, however, the firm discontinues the “carrot and stick” 
compensation schedule and terminates the worker. Again, the loss of pension benefits due 
to continued employment serves as a dignity-preserving device for inducing worker separa- 
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While the proverbial "invisible hand" of efficient competition may well be guiding the 
design of these and other structural features of the American pension system, verification of 
this  proposition is difficult. As  research on these issues continues, it  is important that 
workers, employers, and policymakers fully understand the extent of work disincentives built 
into many US. pension plans. 
Worker  mobility and job entry are additional economic issues affected by pensions. 
Close to three-quarters of  private pension participants  and virtually all  public  pension 
participants belong to defined benefit plans whose benefit and vesting provisions often 
generate steeply rising paths of accrued benefits prior to the plan's early or normal retire- 
ment ages. This tilted age profile of pension compensation provides workers with significant 
incentives to remain at the current job, and thereby reduces labor mobility. Pension com- 
pensation is not, of course, the only device that can be used to promote job stability and 
inhibit labor mobility. Employers  can alter the path of nonpension compensation to achieve 
similar results. 
As in the case of  pension provisions that induce retirement, the disincentives to job 
mobility associated with  many defined benefit plans may actually improve the efficient 
operation of  the  labor market. The  provision of  larger additional pensions and, ceteris 
paribus, total compensation as the worker acquires more service may be enforcing higher 
levels of worker performance. Better performance may result if the worker fears that diminu- 
tion of current work effort could jeopardize his (her) future receipt of compensation. Incen- 
tives for long-term employment may also reflect the employer's desire to insure a reasonable 
return on investment in firm-specific training of  young workers. 
The challenge for future research is to determine whether disincentives to job mobility 
really represent an efficient economic institution  or are simply the unintended consequence 
of  pension provisions instituted for  other purposes. One explanation for  defined benefit 
provisions, for example, has nothing to do with worker incentives; it associates the original 
design of defined benefit plans with unions. Most defined benefit plans base benefits on 
length of  service and possibly past earnings rather than past contributions. By adopting 
defined benefit rather than defined contribution plans, unions insured older union members 
attractive pensions in the near future. But this choice may have had the unintended conse- 
quence of steepening the total compensation-service profile. The fact that 86.05 percent of 
union participants but only 63.05 percent of  nonunion participants are enrolled in defined 
benefit plans supports this argument. 
Pension provisions may also be affecting  hiring  patterns to the  extent that  wage 
compensation is not fully adjustable. Suppose a firm with a defined benefit pension plan 
considers hiring either a 40-year-old male or a 40-year-old female, both of whom are equally 
qualified for the job. According to current mortality schedules (which unfortunately do not 
distinguish  between working  and  nonworking women), 40-year-old women will  live on 
average 6 more years than 40-year-old males.*4  The firm can therefore expect to pay the 
female 6 more years of  pension benefits than the male, assuming that both will become 
vested and terminate employment at the same age. If the firm for reasons  of worker harmony 
or fear of charges of job discrimination is forced to pay identical wages to 35-year-olds 
independent of sex, the firm will have an incentive to hire the 35-year-old male over the 
35-year-old female. Racial differences in longevity could according to this argument lead to 
a hiring bias in favor of nonwhites. White males' life expectancy at 35 is 38.2 years; it is 34.5 
years for nonwhite males. For females the difference by race in life expectancy at age 35 is 
3.1 years.z5 
A similar hiring bias against older workers can occur among firms with defined benefit 
plans. If the firm must pay identical wages to a new 25-year-old employee as it pays to an 
equally productive 45-year-old employee, the firm's total labor costs will be significantly 
greater for  the 45-year-old because benefit accrual occurs more rapidly the closer the 
worker is to retirement age. Sorting out the effects of pensions on hiring of the aged may be of 
critical importance in reversing the postwar trend toward early retirement. 
This section has discussed several of the challenges and opportunities that the U.S. 
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pensions and economic performance is becoming increasingly important: in the realm of 
labor, insurance, and financial markets, U.S. pensions are sufficiently large to alter market 
outcomes dramatically. In the years ahead, private, state, and local pensions are likely to 
assume an even greater  role in providing income security for  the aged. Analysis of the 
economic impact of pensions presupposes a basic set of statistics describing the institution. 
A primary objective of this book is to provide basic pension data in a convenient format that 
will both inform and stimulate research in the economics of pensions. 